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CASE STUDIES

What can we learn from elsewhere?

Experiences from other major projects can reveal questions worth asking before impacts occur and while environmental assessment is still underway.

These case studies examine documented environmental, regulatory and community experiences and consider what lessons they may hold for the proposed Gonneville Project.

CASE STUDY 01 — PINJARRA

THE BASELINE YOU CAN'T COLLECT AFTERWARDS

Dust, air quality and residential rainwater

Western Australia already has a real world example of why comprehensive baseline monitoring matters before a major industrial development begins.

Residents around Alcoa's Pinjarra Alumina Refinery raised concerns about dust, health and possible contamination. Over time, those concerns led to residential sampling, Department of Health investigation and increasingly detailed air quality monitoring by DWER.

One investigation followed the detection of elevated lead and mercury in a resident's rainwater tank. DWER investigated whether airborne refinery dust was responsible but did not establish Alcoa dust as the source.

That outcome highlights an important problem:

Detecting something after an industrial operation is established does not necessarily tell investigators where it came from or whether concentrations have changed.

THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE GAP

When the WA Department of Health investigated community health concerns around Pinjarra, it identified an important limitation: there were very few historical monitoring data showing actual concentrations of particles and gases in surrounding communities.

Later monitoring could measure current conditions.

It could not recreate the environmental baseline that had never been measured.

This distinction matters.

Predictive modelling can estimate what concentrations may occur. Baseline monitoring records what was actually present before conditions changed. Operational monitoring records what is present after development begins.

Without suitable pre development measurements, determining whether environmental conditions have changed and potentially identifying the source of that change can become much more difficult.

THE RAINWATER TANK INVESTIGATION

The Pinjarra case became particularly relevant to rural households when elevated lead and mercury were detected in water collected from a resident's rainwater tank in late 2021 and again in 2022.

DWER investigated whether airborne dust associated with Alcoa's operations could have been responsible. Dust samples were collected from the property, including locations closer to the refinery than the rainwater tank.

The investigation did not establish Alcoa dust as the source of the detected lead and mercury.

That finding is important, but so is the difficulty the investigation illustrates.

Once something is detected in a rainwater tank, investigators must determine where it came from. Potential sources can include natural soil and dust, smoke, roads, roofing or plumbing materials, agriculture, industry, or a combination of sources.

Without suitable pre-development measurements, a fundamental question can become difficult to answer:

Was it there before the industrial development began?

WHEN A DUST EVENT IS ALREADY OVER

The Pinjarra investigations also exposed another practical problem with retrospective monitoring.

In December 2023, DWER returned to investigate further reported dust impacts at a residential property. However, insufficient dust could be collected for laboratory analysis, and the investigation was therefore inconclusive.

This illustrates why responding to complaints after a dust event is not necessarily enough.

By the time investigators arrive, the material needed to determine what occurred and potentially where it came from may no longer be available.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

As community concerns continued, government monitoring became progressively more detailed.

DWER undertook ambient air monitoring around Pinjarra during 2023–24, followed by a six-month monitoring campaign from November 2024 to April 2025. The later campaign deliberately covered the warmer period, including conditions with frequent easterly winds when dust impacts could be greater.

Monitoring went beyond simply measuring “dust”. It included PM₁₀, PM₂.₅, deposited dust, metals, respirable crystalline silica, gases and meteorological conditions, with comparison against background conditions.

The Department of Health reviewed the results and advised that the concentrations measured during the campaign did not represent a public health risk.

But the later monitoring could only establish conditions at the time it was undertaken.

It could not recreate the historical baseline that had never been measured.

That is the important lesson for a project like Gonneville where the opportunity to establish that baseline still exists.

WHAT PINJARRA MEANS FOR GONNEVILLE

Pinjarra does not prove that Gonneville will cause harmful dust exposure or contaminate rainwater.

It demonstrates something different: how difficult environmental questions can become to answer retrospectively when the historical measurements needed to answer them do not exist.

Gonneville has not yet commenced mining. The opportunity still exists to establish robust baseline conditions before large scale operations begin.

If concerns arise in the future, that evidence could help determine what changed, when it changed and whether the project is a plausible source.

Pinjarra's lesson is simple:

THE BASELINE CANNOT BE COLLECTED AFTERWARDS.

Status: Ongoing case study. This page will be updated as new information becomes available.

SOURCES

https://www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/pinjarra-air-quality

https://www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/ambient-dust-monitoring-campaign-pinjarra

https://www.health.wa.gov.au/~/media/Corp/Documents/Reports-and-publications/Shire-of-Murray/Evaluation-of-Cancers-and-Other-Health-Conditions-in-Shire-of-Murray.pdf

CASE STUDY 02 — ECONOMICS

THE TRUE COST OF A MINE

The billion-dollar question behind Gonneville

$820 million.

That is Chalice Mining's estimated Stage 1 development capital for Gonneville in its December 2025 Pre-Feasibility Study.

It sounds like the price of building the mine.

But it isn't the whole capital story.

The same PFS estimates:

$820 million Stage 1 development capital,

$840 million Stage 2 development capital,

$30 million Stage 1 sustaining capital,

$570 million Stage 2 sustaining capital.

Together, those published estimates amount to approximately:

$2.26 BILLION

in nominal development and sustaining capital across the modelled two-stage open-pit operation.

That does not mean $2.26 billion is required upfront. Stage 2 occurs later, and sustaining capital is spent progressively during operations.

But it does raise an important question:

When the economic benefits of Gonneville are discussed, are we seeing the complete economic picture?

Gonneville is a proposed greenfield development requiring not only a mine and processing plant, but substantial supporting infrastructure.

Power.

Water.

Roads and transport.

Off-site infrastructure connections.

Land access.

And potentially infrastructure involving third parties or government.

At the same time, major economic benefits are being attributed to Gonneville through economic modelling whose headline findings have been publicised, while the complete underlying economic impact study has not been made publicly available for independent examination.

So we decided to look beyond the headline numbers.

What will Gonneville actually require to build and operate — what is included in the published capital estimates, what sits outside them, and who ultimately pays?

THE $95 MILLION QUESTION

Buried inside Gonneville's Stage 1 capital estimate is a figure that deserves a closer look.

Infrastructure: $95 million.

According to Chalice's Pre-Feasibility Study, the $820 million Stage 1 development capital is divided across mining, the processing plant, tailings storage, infrastructure, indirect and owner's costs, and contingency.

The Stage 1 infrastructure allowance is $95 million.

But Gonneville requires substantial infrastructure to operate.

Chalice's own project information describes:

a new approximately 63 km water pipeline from the Alkimos wastewater treatment plant

a new approximately 27 km dual transmission line connecting the project towards the South West Interconnected System

onsite hybrid solar-battery generation with diesel peaking

transport of processed materials to ports

upgrades to local roads

Earlier project disclosures have also stated that Chalice was engaging with the WA and Commonwealth Governments about potential common-user infrastructure options and funding support.

None of this proves that infrastructure expenditure has been omitted from the PFS.

But it creates an obvious question.

WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE $95 MILLION INCLUDE?

Does it include the complete cost of constructing the proposed off-site power connection?

Does it include the complete water pipeline?

Does it include land access and corridor establishment?

What road upgrades are included?

What infrastructure would instead be constructed, owned or funded by utilities or other third parties?

And is any infrastructure required by Gonneville expected to involve government funding, co-investment or other public expenditure?

Those distinctions matter.

If infrastructure required to enable a mine is funded outside the mine's own development capital estimate, that does not make the infrastructure cost disappear.

It changes where the cost sits, and potentially who pays it.

A QUESTION THAT DESERVES A CLEAR ANSWER

Before the economic benefits of Gonneville are weighed against its costs, the community should be able to see a clear breakdown of:

what infrastructure Gonneville requires, what it will cost, where those costs appear in the project's financial estimates, and who is expected to fund them.

Until that information is clear, the $95 million infrastructure line raises more questions than it answers.

THE COST HAS CHANGED

Gonneville has not always carried an $820 million starting price.

The 2023 Scoping Study considered development options with initial capital estimates of approximately $1.6 billion to $2.3 billion, with further expansion capital of $1.1 billion to $1.9 billion.

The project has changed significantly since then, including a simplified processing flowsheet, so these figures cannot be directly compared with today's PFS.

But they demonstrate something important:

Gonneville's design and its cost has continued to evolve.

With the full Feasibility Study still to come, the current $820 million Stage 1 estimate should not be mistaken for a final construction price.

A financially attractive PFS is not the same thing as a financed project.

Chalice is still progressing the financing structure for Gonneville as the Feasibility Study continues.

THE REPORT YOU CAN'T SEE

In June 2026, Lawrence Consulting completed a new Economic Impact Study for Gonneville using inputs from the project's PFS.

Its headline findings have been promoted publicly, including:

$24.1 billion contribution to WA's economy

3,761 direct and indirect jobs supported on average

$7.7 billion in purchases from more than 1,200 local businesses

But the complete study has not been publicly released for independent scrutiny.

That matters.

Without the full report, it is difficult to examine the assumptions and methodology behind those numbers, including what “local” means, where expenditure is expected to occur, what infrastructure assumptions were used and what costs were considered.

If these figures are being used to demonstrate Gonneville's economic benefit, the community should be able to see how they were calculated.

WHAT HAS TO GO RIGHT?

Gonneville's economics depend on more than what it costs to build.

They also depend on the future value of the metals it is expected to produce, including palladium and other platinum group metals, nickel, copper and cobalt.

Chalice's financial modelling therefore relies on long-term commodity-price assumptions. If those prices change, so do the projected value and financial returns of the project.

That matters over a mine life measured in decades.

In its September 2026 reporting, Chalice again discussed changing global commodity markets, including the outlook for platinum group metals, developments in the Chinese and wider automotive markets, and growing demand for copper.

Gonneville's mix of metals provides diversification, but it does not remove commodity-price exposure.

So alongside the question of what Gonneville will ultimately cost to build is another:

How dependent are its projected returns on the commodity prices assumed in the PFS?

That deserves the same scrutiny as the headline economic benefits.

WHO BENEFITS WHEN GONNEVILLE MOVES FORWARD?

There is another financial dimension to Gonneville that deserves public attention.

Executive remuneration.

Chalice Mining's 2026 Annual Report identifies obtaining major regulatory approvals required for a Final Investment Decision on Gonneville among the performance objectives attached to executive long-term incentives.

Other objectives include completing the Feasibility Study and securing project financing.

These are conditional incentives, not guaranteed payments. They form part of a broader remuneration framework and are not inherently improper.

But they raise an important question.

There is another revealing detail in Chalice's remuneration disclosures.

For the 2025–26 financial year, Chalice awarded executive short-term incentives based partly on progress towards its development objectives. A positive sustainability adjustment was also applied because none of the specified breaches had occurred.

Yet the published social-performance triggers focus on matters such as material regulatory breaches and disputes resulting in permanent loss of land access or the immediate halting of operations.

They do not expressly identify unresolved community objections, loss of rural amenity or the cumulative impacts experienced by neighbouring landholders.

This does not establish that Chalice ignores those concerns in its broader decision-making.

But it raises an important question about how they are reflected in executive performance assessments.

A mining project can progress towards development while neighbouring families remain uncertain about the future of their homes, properties and environment.

The financial rewards associated with progressing Gonneville may benefit executives and shareholders.

The potential consequences for surrounding communities are very different.

When financial incentives reward progress towards development, how does the board ensure that environmental uncertainty and community impacts receive appropriate consideration?

And how are those considerations reflected in the rewards ultimately received?

The financial incentives are disclosed. The community deserves to understand how the safeguards work.

DO THE NUMBERS ADD UP?

Gonneville is being promoted with some very big economic numbers.

But the $820 million Stage 1 figure is only one part of a much larger capital picture.

The PFS identifies further Stage 2 and sustaining capital. Major infrastructure is still being planned. Funding arrangements are still developing. And the final Feasibility Study is yet to come.

Meanwhile, billions of dollars in economic benefits are being attributed to the project through modelling that the public cannot fully examine because the complete Economic Impact Study has not been released.

That doesn't mean the economic claims are wrong.

It means we cannot yet see the whole equation.

Before Gonneville's economic benefits are accepted at face value, the community deserves to know the full cost of the project, what sits inside and outside the published estimates, whether public or third-party funding will be required, and the assumptions behind the benefits being claimed.

The benefits are being publicised.

The full picture should be too.

THE $24.1 BILLION QUESTION

What do Gonneville's headline economic benefits actually mean?

Chalice Mining is promoting some very large numbers for the proposed Gonneville Project.

$24.1 billion contribution to Western Australia's economy.

$7.7 billion spent with more than 1,200 Western Australian businesses.

$813.8 million spent in the Wheatbelt.

$899.8 million paid to the WA Government in royalties and taxes.

3,761 direct and indirect jobs supported across Western Australia.

And approximately $2.20 generated for the WA economy for every $1 invested in Gonneville.

These figures sound impressive.

But they are not money already generated by Gonneville.

They are economic forecasts produced for a project that has not yet received its final environmental approvals, has not reached a Final Investment Decision and has not been constructed.

The figures come from an economic impact study prepared by Lawrence Consulting using project assumptions supplied for Gonneville.

That raises an important question.

WHERE IS THE COMPLETE STUDY?

Headline numbers tell the public the result of economic modelling.

They do not show us how that result was calculated.

To properly understand a forecast of $24.1 billion, the community needs to be able to examine the assumptions behind it, including what has been counted as direct economic activity, what comes from indirect or flow-on effects, what economic multipliers have been applied, how employment has been calculated, where expenditure is expected to occur and how changes in the project's assumptions affect the result.

This matters because $24.1 billion in Gross State Product is not $24.1 billion paid to Western Australians.

It is not Chalice's profit.

It is not government revenue.

And it is not $24.1 billion being spent in the communities surrounding Gonneville.

It is a modelled estimate of the project's contribution to economic activity across Western Australia over many years.

If $24.1 billion is important enough to promote to the community and government, the modelling behind $24.1 billion is important enough for the community to see.

$24.1 BILLION — BUT WHAT DOES IT ACTUALLY MEAN?

The $24.1 billion figure is a forecast contribution to Western Australia's Gross State Product (GSP).

It is not $24.1 billion paid to government, local communities or Western Australians.

Economic impact modelling can include the project's direct activity as well as wider flow-on activity through suppliers, workers and other businesses.

Without the complete Gonneville Economic Impact Study, the public cannot see how much of the $24.1 billion is direct, how much comes from wider economic effects, or the assumptions and multipliers used to calculate it.

The same question applies to the claim that every $1 invested in Gonneville generates approximately $2.20 for the WA economy.

What exactly is being counted?

A headline number tells us the result.

The underlying study tells us what that result actually means.

$7.7 BILLION — HOW LOCAL IS “LOCAL”?

Chalice says Gonneville could generate $7.7 billion in purchases from more than 1,200 Western Australian businesses.

But the same economic modelling identifies $813.8 million in direct expenditure in the Wheatbelt.

The Wheatbelt itself covers a vast area and is not the same thing as the communities surrounding Gonneville.

So how much of the projected spending would actually occur in Chittering, Toodyay and nearby communities?

A regional headline is useful.

A local breakdown would be far more informative.

419 JOBS — WHERE ARE THEY?

Chalice promotes 419 long-term jobs associated with Gonneville.

But its material describes these as direct residential operational jobs across Perth and the Wheatbelt.

That is different from 419 jobs in the communities surrounding the mine.

The economic modelling also refers to 3,761 direct and indirect jobs supported across Western Australia.

How many would actually be based in Chittering, Toodyay and surrounding communities?

For communities being asked to accept the impacts of Gonneville, that distinction matters.

$899.8 MILLION TO GOVERNMENT — OVER WHAT PERIOD?

Chalice forecasts $899.8 million in royalties and taxes paid to the WA Government.

The figure sounds substantial, but it is a forecast across the life of the project, not an annual payment.

The newsletter also forecasts $6.3 million paid to local governments.

Which local governments?

How much would go to Toodyay and Chittering?

And over how many years?

For communities being asked to weigh Gonneville's costs and benefits, the timeframe and destination of these payments matter just as much as the headline total.

WHY THIS MATTERS

Gonneville may deliver substantial economic benefits to Western Australia.

But communities should be able to examine those benefits with the same scrutiny applied to the project's costs and impacts.

The headline figures come from economic modelling. Yet the complete study behind them is not publicly available for independent scrutiny.

Publish the study.

Show the assumptions.

Show the local breakdown.

Then let the numbers speak for themselves.

CASE STUDY 03 — UNDERGROUND POWER

UNDERGROUND DOESN'T MEAN UNDISTURBED

What could underground 132 kV transmission actually mean for the landscape?

Putting transmission infrastructure underground can sound like the lower-impact option.

It removes overhead conductors and poles from the view and can substantially reduce visual impacts.

But underground high-voltage transmission still has a physical footprint and during construction, that footprint can involve considerably more than the width of the cable trench itself.

For Gonneville, that distinction matters.

Chalice's current base case includes a 132 kV dual-circuit transmission connection, with undergrounding proposed through the Maryville Heights rural-residential area.

Part of that route passes through an established Tree Preservation Area containing mature native vegetation.

So the relevant question is not simply:

Overhead or underground?

It is:

What would each option actually require on the ground?

WHAT DOES “UNDERGROUND” ACTUALLY INVOLVE?

Underground transmission is not simply a matter of digging a narrow trench, laying a cable and covering it over.

Western Power's own material for current 132 kV underground transmission works describes construction involving open trenching, installation of conduits, backfilling and compaction, cable hauling and jointing.

Where open trenching is used, the trench itself may be relatively narrow.

But the trench is only part of the construction footprint.

Space can also be required for machinery, excavated material, construction access, cable installation and jointing works.

Where horizontal directional drilling is used to avoid obstacles or particularly sensitive areas, entry and receiving pits and associated work areas are still required.

This creates an important distinction:

TRENCH WIDTH is not the same thing as CONSTRUCTION DISTURBANCE WIDTH.

And neither is necessarily the same as the PERMANENT EASEMENT once construction is complete.

For mature vegetation, there is another consideration.

ROOTS.

Underground infrastructure can require excavation through the soil occupied by tree root systems.

That is particularly relevant at Maryville Heights, where mature native trees occur within the Tree Preservation Area.

An arborist assessment of one large mature wandoo within the area calculated a Structural Root Zone of approximately 3 metres from the trunk.

The Structural Root Zone is the area considered necessary for the tree's stability. It is separate from the potentially larger Tree Protection Zone used when assessing impacts on retained trees.

This means an underground alignment does not necessarily have to remove a tree directly to affect it.

Excavation, trenching and associated construction works close to mature trees can interact with important root systems below ground.

An underground alignment may therefore reduce the visual impact of overhead transmission infrastructure while introducing a different type of disturbance beneath the surface.

In a Tree Preservation Area, that distinction matters.

THE SPACE THE TRENCH DOESN'T SHOW

The environmental footprint of underground transmission is not determined by trench width alone.

Western Power's published information for a current 132 kV underground transmission project describes trenches approximately 1.5 metres wide. But constructing those trenches requires considerably more space.

Excavated topsoil and deeper subsoil may need to be stored separately. Machinery must operate alongside the excavation, construction vehicles require access, and cable-jointing works need additional working areas.

Western Australia's excavation code recommends keeping excavated material and equipment at least 600 mm from the excavation edge, preferably 2 metres where practicable.

An independent engineering assessment by DNV illustrates underground 132 kV construction using separate topsoil and subsoil stockpiles. Its examples demonstrate construction working strips of approximately 21–33 metres, depending on the number of cables and transmission capacity.

These are engineering examples, not confirmed dimensions for Chalice's proposed corridor.

But they demonstrate why a relatively narrow cable trench can require a substantially wider construction area.

WHAT ABOUT THE WATER PIPELINE?

Chalice now proposes to concentrate its power and water infrastructure within one preferred corridor.

The combined construction requirements therefore need to be understood, including separate excavations, stockpiles, machinery access and any shared working areas.

The total width cannot be established simply by adding two trench widths together.

At Maryville Heights, these questions are especially important because the revised alignment adjoins mature native woodland, hollow-bearing trees and a Tree Preservation Area.

Trenching may damage structural roots. Heavy machinery and soil stockpiles may compact soil within sensitive root zones. Neither impact necessarily requires a tree to be directly cleared.

For Gonneville, the critical question remains unanswered: how much land would actually be disturbed when the underground power cables, water pipeline, excavated soil, machinery and access requirements are considered together?

Until Chalice provides detailed construction plans showing the full extent of temporary and permanent disturbance, the potential consequences for mature trees, their root systems and surrounding wildlife habitat cannot be properly understood.

Underground does not automatically mean less environmental damage.

A REAL 132 kV COMPARISON

There is a useful Australian example of why the distinction matters.

An environmental assessment for another project compared alternative 132 kV dual-circuit transmission connections over broadly similar route lengths.

The indicative disturbance footprint was:

Overhead option 6.6 hectares over approximately 1.7 km.

Underground options 8.5 to 8.6 hectares over approximately 1.7 km.

In that assessment, the underground alternatives therefore had a larger indicative disturbance footprint than the overhead option.

This does NOT mean underground transmission will always disturb more land.

Different projects have different terrain, vegetation, designs, access requirements and construction methods.

And these figures cannot simply be transferred to Gonneville.

But the comparison demonstrates something important:

Putting high-voltage transmission underground does not automatically mean a smaller environmental disturbance footprint.

The trench is only one part of the equation.

For Gonneville, the actual comparison can only be made once the construction requirements and disturbance footprint of the proposed underground section are known.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR GONNEVILLE?

Chalice has proposed undergrounding the 132 kV transmission line through the Maryville Heights rural-residential area.

But “underground” does not, by itself, tell affected landholders what the construction footprint will actually look like.

The proposed route passes through an area containing mature native vegetation, including the Tree Preservation Area.

What matters is not simply the width of the finished cable easement.

It is the total area that may need to be disturbed during construction — including trenching, access, machinery, cable installation, jointing areas and any other associated works.

That distinction becomes particularly important around mature trees.

A tree may remain standing while excavation or construction occurs within the surrounding root system.

And in this area, an arborist assessment of one large mature wandoo calculated a Structural Root Zone extending approximately 3 metres from its trunk.

We have not identified publicly available information showing the actual construction disturbance footprint required for the proposed underground section through Maryville Heights.

Until that is known, it cannot simply be assumed that putting the transmission line underground means minimal disturbance to the vegetation above it.

AND THEN THERE IS FUTURE-PROOFING

There is another reason the final physical footprint matters.

Chalice has previously told landholders that future-proofing of the proposed power infrastructure was being investigated in consultation with Western Power.

That matters because the question is not only what infrastructure Gonneville requires today.

It is what the corridor may ultimately be designed to accommodate.

Chalice's current base case is a 132 kV dual circuit transmission connection. But until the detailed design is available, the community cannot see whether provision for future capacity would change the underground infrastructure, construction requirements or disturbance footprint through Maryville Heights.

OUR FINDING

Underground power should not be confused with low impact power.

It can reduce visual impacts, but high-voltage underground transmission requires substantial construction activity at ground level and can create continuous disturbance along parts of a route.

Real Australian 132 kV examples demonstrate that an underground option can have a larger construction disturbance footprint than an overhead alternative.

That does not establish what will happen at Gonneville.

It establishes why the actual footprint must be known before claims about the benefits of undergrounding can be properly understood.

That is particularly important where the proposed route passes through a Tree Preservation Area containing mature native trees whose root systems extend well beyond their trunks.

For Maryville Heights, the relevant measure is not simply whether the powerline can be seen when construction is finished.

It is what has to happen to the landscape to put it underground in the first place.

Until the detailed design, construction footprint and implications of any future-proofing are publicly clear, “underground” should not be treated as shorthand for “less environmental impact”.